Executive briefing · Read this first
What leaders need to know
Who it is for. Suppliers and manufacturers of digital health technology, and NHS and adult social care organisations in England that procure, deploy or operate it — including clinical safety, information governance, security, procurement and executive leads.
The questions it helps answer
- Which assurance routes are likely to apply to this technology, in this setting?
- Which organisation, and which role, is responsible for each assessment?
- What evidence supports each decision, and is it current, relevant and sufficient?
- What remains for the deploying organisation to decide after supplier evidence is received?
The four assurance routes
- DSPT
- The Data Security and Protection Toolkit is an organisational self-assessment. Organisations with access to NHS patient data and systems must use it. Requirements differ by organisation category: for 2026–27 (version 9), NHS trusts, ICBs, ALBs, CSUs, operators of essential services and genomics organisations (category 1) use a format aligned to the Cyber Assessment Framework, while IT suppliers (category 2), other organisations such as local authorities, social care and pharmacy (category 3) and GP practices (category 4) have their own assertion sets. A DSPT submission describes an organisation, not a product.
- DTAC
- The Digital Technology Assessment Criteria is NHS England's assessment framework for commissioners and providers assuring digital health technology. Manufacturers keep a current DTAC form and supporting documents for each product version; buyers use it for due diligence. NHS England introduced an updated form in early 2026; the previous form was retired, with full transition to the updated form by 6 April 2026. DTAC sits alongside — it does not replace — medical device regulation, ICO registration, the DSPT or the clinical safety standards.
- DCB0129
- The clinical risk management standard for manufacturers of health IT systems (current published version: Amd 24/2018, specification v4.2). It requires a proportionate clinical risk management process, a clinical risk management plan, a hazard log and clinical safety case reports, and a Clinical Safety Officer nominated by top management who is a suitably qualified and experienced clinician with current professional registration.
- DCB0160
- The clinical risk management standard for health and care organisations that deploy, use, maintain or decommission health IT systems (current published version: Amd 25/2018, specification v3.2). The deploying organisation runs its own process, with its own Clinical Safety Officer, for the local environment, configuration and workflow; when procuring, it must ensure the manufacturer and the system comply with DCB0129, and its top management authorises deployment, accepting any residual clinical risk.
DCB0129 and DCB0160 are information standards published under section 250 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Section 95 of the Health and Care Act 2022, in force from 7 July 2025, changed the statutory duty from “have regard to” to “comply with”, and section 121 of and Schedule 15 to the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, in force from 5 February 2026, allow information standards to apply to relevant IT providers.
Regulation 3 of SI 2025/807 saves the previous position for any information standard already in effect before 7 July 2025, which includes the 2018 versions of DCB0129 and DCB0160. NHS England's supporting information for its national review of the two standards states that, as they stand, bodies exercising a health and care function must continue to have regard to them, and that future revisions are likely to use the enhanced powers.
The review's public consultation ran from 29 June to 11 September 2026; at the verification date no revised standard or consultation outcome had been published. Contracts, commissioning terms, DTAC and NHS England policy may separately require conformance with both standards.
Supplier evidence is an essential input. It does not discharge the deploying organisation's own clinical risk management, data protection, security or governance responsibilities.
What this does not establish. This playbook is an IG-Smart planning resource. It is not an NHS publication, does not confer certification, NHS approval or a compliance determination, and does not replace the official standards, a mandatory local process or qualified clinical, legal or regulatory advice.
About this resource: this playbook provides general guidance and assurance-planning information for organisations in England. It is not an official NHS publication and is not individualised legal or clinical safety advice. It does not certify any product or organisation, confirm compliance or procurement readiness, or transfer responsibilities away from suppliers, deployers or other accountable organisations.
01 / Applicability
Work out what applies, and to whom
Answer these in order before anyone collects evidence. A route that does not apply should be recorded as such, with the reason — not silently skipped. Not every requirement applies to every product.
1Establish your role. Are you manufacturing, supplying or reselling, procuring, deploying or operating the technology? One organisation can hold more than one role — for example a trust that configures or develops a system may also act as a manufacturer for DCB0129 purposes.
Output: Role statement for each organisation involved
2Define the intended purpose and setting. What does the technology do, for which users, in which care setting, and what is out of scope? Note integrations, data flows and any clinical decision support.
Output: Intended-use statement and scope boundary
3Identify the applicable assurance routes. Test each route against the facts: is it a health IT system (DCB0129/DCB0160)? A digital health technology within NICE's definition (DTAC)? Does any organisation access NHS patient data and systems (DSPT)? Is it a medical device?
Output: Applicability record with the reason for each decision
4Assign the responsible organisation and role. For each route, name the organisation and role that prepares, reviews and decides — including each Clinical Safety Officer.
Output: Responsibility matrix (see section 3)
5Mark where supplier evidence must be evaluated locally. Record which supplier artefacts the deployer will review, against which local question, and who is competent to do so.
Output: Local evaluation plan
6Flag separate specialist questions. Medical-device classification, contractual terms, data protection roles, cyber security and accessibility may need separate legal or technical assessment. Record them rather than resolving them by assumption.
Output: Referral list with owners
02 / Accountability
Who prepares, reviews and decides
An illustrative planning matrix, not a universal RACI or legal allocation. Actual responsibilities depend on the applicable requirements, each organisation's role and the contract.
| Route | Supplier / manufacturer | Deploying organisation | Decision that stays local |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intended use | Defines and maintains the product's intended purpose, functionality and known limitations. | Confirms the local use case, users, environment, workflow and configuration. | Whether the intended local use matches what the supplier has assessed. |
| DCB0129 | Runs manufacturer clinical risk management; maintains hazard log and safety case; appoints a Clinical Safety Officer. | When procuring, ensures the manufacturer and product comply with DCB0129 (DCB0160, section 2.5); reviews relevant supplier safety material, its scope and stated limitations. | Whether the supplier's safety evidence is sufficient for local reliance. |
| DCB0160 | Supplies information that supports local hazard identification. | Runs local clinical risk management with its own Clinical Safety Officer; top management authorises deployment, accepting any residual clinical risk. | Acceptance of residual clinical risk and go-live. |
| DTAC | Completes the current DTAC form in full, with supporting evidence, for the product version supplied. | Requests and evaluates the DTAC form as part of due diligence. | Whether the product is acceptable for procurement and adoption. |
| DSPT | Determines and meets its own organisational DSPT obligations, where in scope. | Meets its own DSPT obligations and decides what supplier assurance it needs. | Whether supplier security assurance is adequate for the data involved. |
| Data protection | Provides relevant processing and security information, subject to its actual role as controller, joint controller or processor; supports DPIA inputs where applicable. | Establishes with relevant parties which organisations act as controller, joint controller or processor — based on who in practice decides the purposes and means of processing — and the resulting lawful bases and DPIA responsibilities. | The authorised organisation(s) responsible decide whether processing can lawfully proceed. |
Clinical Safety Officer role. Each organisation's top management must nominate a Clinical Safety Officer, who must be a suitably qualified and experienced clinician with current registration with an appropriate professional body (DCB0129 and DCB0160, section 2.3). The standards do not expressly state whether one individual may act for more than one organisation. Do not presume either way: examine competence, appointment terms, workload, independence and conflicts of interest, and keep separate organisational decisions and records.
03 / Evidence
Supplier and deployer evidence, category by category
For each of the eight categories: why the evidence matters, who ordinarily prepares and reviews it, what supports it, which limitations to record and what remains for the deploying organisation to decide.
01Intended use and product description
Function, intended users, context and material changes
- Purpose
- Defines the product, intended use and version being assessed so subsequent evidence has a clear scope.
- Prepared by
- Supplier
- Reviewed by
- Deployer clinical safety and digital leads
- Supporting documents
- Product description, intended-use statement, release notes, integration and data-flow diagrams
- Record limitations
- Functions outside the assessed scope; planned changes
- Deployer decides
- Whether local use stays within the stated purpose
02Current DTAC assessment and evidence
Where applicable, using the current NHS England form
- Purpose
- Provides supplier responses and evidence for a buyer to assess against the applicable DTAC criteria for the specified product/version; completion alone does not establish conformity or approval.
- Prepared by
- Supplier (manufacturer input if a reseller supplies)
- Reviewed by
- Deployer procurement and assurance leads
- Supporting documents
- Completed current DTAC form with every section answered, plus supporting documents
- Record limitations
- Superseded form; sections answered by reference only; different product version
- Deployer decides
- Procurement and adoption acceptance
03Supplier clinical safety evidence
DCB0129 documents where applicable
- Purpose
- Demonstrates manufacturer clinical risk management across the product lifecycle.
- Prepared by
- Supplier clinical safety team / authorised responsible role, with the Supplier Clinical Safety Officer performing the approval or oversight required by DCB0129
- Reviewed by
- Deployer Clinical Safety Officer
- Supporting documents
- Clinical risk management plan, hazard log, clinical safety case report, CSO details
- Record limitations
- Hazards transferred to the deployer; assumptions about local use
- Deployer decides
- Degree of local reliance on supplier analysis
04Deployer clinical risk record
DCB0160 local assessment where applicable
- Purpose
- Assesses hazards arising from local configuration, workflow, training and integration.
- Prepared by
- Deployer clinical safety team / authorised responsible role, with the Deployer Clinical Safety Officer performing the approval or oversight required by DCB0160
- Reviewed by
- Deployer clinical safety governance; top management for authorisation
- Supporting documents
- Local clinical risk management plan, local hazard log, safety case report, deployment authorisation
- Record limitations
- Open hazards, controls not yet implemented
- Deployer decides
- Residual-risk acceptance and go-live
05DSPT organisational assurance position
Scope and current submission status as relevant
- Purpose
- Confirms each organisation's own data security and protection position.
- Prepared by
- Each organisation for itself
- Reviewed by
- Deployer information governance and security leads
- Supporting documents
- Current DSPT status and year, category, improvement plan where relevant
- Record limitations
- Status from a previous year; organisation not the one processing the data
- Deployer decides
- Supplier security assurance needed beyond the DSPT
06Data protection and information governance
Roles, lawful basis and DPIA where required
- Purpose
- Supports determination and documentation of appropriate lawful processing, roles and controls; does not alone establish legal compliance. Where a DPIA is required it is the controller's responsibility, with processors assisting.
- Prepared by
- Relevant controller(s) and processor(s), according to actual processing roles, with supplier and deployer input as applicable.
- Reviewed by
- Data Protection Officer; Caldicott Guardian where relevant
- Supporting documents
- DPIA, processing terms, data-flow map, retention, information-sharing arrangements
- Record limitations
- Unresolved roles; international transfers; sub-processors
- Deployer decides
- Authorised controller/processor decision-makers determine whether and on what conditions processing proceeds.
07Security and interoperability evidence
Controls, testing, integration and accessibility evidence
- Purpose
- Provides evidence for assessment of security, interoperability and accessibility within a defined testing and assurance scope; does not establish absolute security or usability.
- Prepared by
- Supplier
- Reviewed by
- Deployer security, technical and accessibility leads
- Supporting documents
- Penetration test summary, certifications with scope, interoperability standards, accessibility statement
- Record limitations
- Test scope and date; findings not yet remediated
- Deployer decides
- Acceptance of residual technical risk
08Decision records and review ownership
Accountable decisions, outstanding actions and ongoing monitoring
- Purpose
- Records who decided what, on which evidence, and when it will be reviewed.
- Prepared by
- Deployer governance lead
- Reviewed by
- SIRO, executive sponsor or delegated board committee
- Supporting documents
- Decision log, conditions, action plan, reassessment triggers
- Record limitations
- Decisions made without a named owner or evidence reference
- Deployer decides
- Deployment and acceptance decisions allocated to the duly authorised organisation or role, according to the applicable governance arrangements
For a working start, use the interactive checklist on the resource page; its selections are local-only and are not a formal assessment.
04 / Traceability
Making each item traceable
An item of evidence is only useful when a reviewer can answer eight questions about it:
- 1Requirement or assurance question
- 2Applicability
- 3Accountable owner
- 4Evidence reference
- 5Version and review date
- 6Sufficiency or limitation
- 7Outstanding action
- 8Target decision or review milestone
Fictional worked example — “Example Clinic Scheduler” — an invented appointment-scheduling tool that sends patient reminders, being deployed by an invented community provider. Names, versions and dates are illustrative only.
| Requirement or assurance question | Applicability | Accountable owner | Evidence reference | Version and review date | Sufficiency or limitation | Outstanding action | Target decision or review milestone |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Is the supplier's clinical safety case current for the version being deployed? | Applies — health IT system (DCB0129) | Manufacturer top management (accountable); Supplier CSO (clinical safety duties) | Safety case report SCR-v3 | v3.0 · reviewed Aug (example) | Covers v3.0; deployment is v3.2 — gap recorded | Request updated safety case for v3.2 | Before the local hazard workshop |
| Have local workflow hazards been assessed? | Applies — local deployment (DCB0160) | Deploying organisation top management (accountable); Deployer CSO (clinical safety duties) | Local hazard log LHL-01 | Draft · workshop pending | Reminder-failure hazard not yet assessed | Run hazard workshop with the clinic team | Go-live decision meeting |
An absent artefact is not automatically a failure; it first prompts an applicability check.
05 / Common gaps
Four things to challenge early
Practical review themes drawn from the structure of the requirements — not statistics about how often procurements fail.
01Outdated requirements
Teams rely on a superseded DTAC form, a prior-year DSPT position, or treat consultation proposals as operative requirements.
Consequence: Evidence is rejected or re-requested late, and decisions rest on the wrong criteria.
Proportionate action: Check every requirement against the current primary source at the start, and record the version and date checked.
02Confused accountability
A supplier's clinical safety file is treated as a substitute for the deploying organisation's own assessment.
Consequence: Local hazards from configuration and workflow go unassessed, and no one is authorised to accept residual risk.
Proportionate action: Name the deployer's Clinical Safety Officer and the person who authorises deployment before evidence review begins.
03Evidence without traceability
Documents are collected, but their owner, version, scope or corresponding assurance question is unclear.
Consequence: Reviewers cannot tell whether evidence is sufficient, and the record will not withstand challenge.
Proportionate action: Log each item against the eight ledger fields; reject unversioned or unowned evidence.
04No continuing review
Product changes, incidents or workflow modifications have no assigned mechanism for reassessment.
Consequence: The assurance position silently goes out of date after go-live.
Proportionate action: Agree reassessment triggers and a review date at the decision point, with a named owner.
06 / Lifecycle
Scope → Map → Prepare → Challenge → Maintain
IG-Smart's proposed assurance-planning approach — not a sequence prescribed by NHS England, and not a promised timeline.
| Stage | Key decision | Typical activities | Outputs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Which roles, routes and sites are in scope? | Confirm intended use; work through the applicability pathway | Scope statement; applicability record |
| Map | Who prepares, reviews and decides for each route? | Build the responsibility matrix; inventory existing evidence | Responsibility matrix; evidence ledger (draft) |
| Prepare | Which gaps must close before a decision? | Request missing artefacts; run local hazard and privacy assessments | Updated ledger; local assessments |
| Challenge | Is the evidence relevant, current and sufficient? | Independent review of evidence quality; escalate unresolved risk | Sufficiency findings; risk and action list |
| Maintain | What triggers reassessment, and who owns it? | Record decisions and conditions; monitor changes and incidents | Decision log; review schedule; change triggers |
Change management. "Maintain" is continuous: a new product version, integration, workflow change or incident should return the affected items to "Scope" for the parts that changed.
07 / Decisions
From available evidence to a defensible decision
Management should see more than whether a document exists. The fictional ledger below separates availability from quality, unresolved matters, accountability, the approval needed and what needs continued oversight.
| Area | Evidence available | Quality and relevance | Unresolved | Risk owner | Approval needed | Continued oversight |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Product clinical safety | Supplier safety case v3.0 | Relevant; one version behind | Update for v3.2 | Deploying organisation's top management, advised by its Clinical Safety Officer | CSO recommendation | Re-check at each release |
| Local clinical risk | Draft local hazard log | Incomplete | Workflow hazard workshop | Deploying organisation's top management, advised by its Clinical Safety Officer | Deployment authorisation by top management, accepting residual clinical risk | Incident review |
| DTAC evidence | Current form, all sections | Supplier responses available; buyer sufficiency decision pending | Evaluate outstanding DTAC applicability and supporting evidence | Procurement lead | Procurement sign-off | Re-request on major version |
| Data protection | DPIA in draft | Sub-processor list missing | Obtain list and terms | Controller-designated information governance / processing risk owner | Authorised controller decision-maker, seeking the DPO's advice where one is designated | Revisit following processing or risk changes; review date set by context |
Questions for your internal review meeting
Procurement
- Is the DTAC form the current version, fully completed, for the exact product version we are buying?
- Which contractual terms secure updated evidence when the product changes?
- Which supplier claims are unsupported by dated evidence?
Clinical safety
- Has our Clinical Safety Officer reviewed the supplier's safety case and its stated limitations?
- Which hazards arise only from our configuration, workflow or integration?
- Who is authorised to accept residual clinical risk, and on what evidence?
Executive
- What decision are we being asked to make, and what conditions attach to it?
- Which unresolved matters would change that decision?
- What will trigger a review after go-live, and who owns it?
08 / Related dependencies
What else may need separate assessment
Signposts only. This playbook does not provide comprehensive advice on these disciplines.
- Data protection
- UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018: controller and processor roles, lawful basis, DPIAs and international transfers. ICO registration may also be required. The ICO marks its controller/processor, DPO and DPIA guidance as under review following the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025; confirm the current text at the point of use.
- Medical-device classification
- Some software is a medical device under UK regulation administered by the MHRA. DTAC does not replace device obligations; NHS England's Pre-Acquisition Questionnaire (PAQ) applies to medical devices; where a product is both a digital health technology and a medical device, both forms may be needed. From 16 June 2025, strengthened post-market surveillance requirements (Part 4A of the UK Medical Devices Regulations 2002, inserted by SI 2024/1368) apply to devices placed on the Great Britain market, including software and AI as a medical device.
- Cyber security
- The DSPT, supplier security evidence and, for operators of essential services (in England, NHS trusts and foundation trusts, ICBs and certain designated independent healthcare providers), NIS Regulations 2018 obligations. Certification claims should be checked for scope and date. The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, introduced in November 2025, would reform the NIS Regulations 2018 and bring certain managed-service suppliers into scope; it was at report stage in the House of Lords at the verification date and is not yet in force.
- Information sharing
- Data-sharing agreements, Caldicott principles and the National Data Opt-out where relevant.
- Procurement
- Framework and contract terms determine how evidence is supplied, updated and enforced over the life of the contract.
09 / Official references
Primary sources and limitations
The source register documents research conducted on 14 October 2026, including whether official sources were read directly or through archived/indexed official copies. This is IG-Smart's interpretation, not individual legal or clinical advice. Consultation proposals are not implemented requirements. Verify applicability and the current version at the point of use.
- NHS England — Data Security and Protection Toolkit 2026–27 (version 9): outcomes, assertions and evidence items
- NHS England — DSPT organisation types and categories
- NHS England Digital — Digital Technology Assessment Criteria (DTAC) guidance for buyers and suppliers
- NHS England Digital — How DTAC works
- NHS England Digital — DTAC in relation to other regulatory and assurance processes
- NHS Innovation Service — Updated DTAC form and guidance (4 March 2026)
- NHS England Digital — DCB0129: Clinical Risk Management: its Application in the Manufacture of Health IT Systems (Amd 24/2018, specification v4.2)
- NHS England Digital — DCB0160: Clinical Risk Management: its Application in the Deployment and Use of Health IT Systems (Amd 25/2018, specification v3.2)
- NHS England — National review of clinical risk management standards DCB0129 and DCB0160: supporting information
- NHS England — National review of DCB0129 and DCB0160: public consultation (29 June – 11 September 2026)
- UK legislation — Health and Social Care Act 2012, section 250 (information standards)
- UK legislation — Health and Care Act 2022, section 95
- UK legislation — SI 2025/807, Health and Care Act 2022 (Commencement No. 10 and Transitional and Saving Provision) Regulations 2025, regulation 3
- UK legislation — Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, Schedule 15 (information standards for health and adult social care), in force 5 February 2026 (SI 2026/82)
- ICO — Controllers and processors
- ICO — Data protection officers
- ICO — Data protection impact assessments
- MHRA — Medical devices: post-market surveillance requirements (in force 16 June 2025)
- MHRA — Software and artificial intelligence (AI) as a medical device
- NHS England — Pre-acquisition questionnaire (PAQ)
- DHSC — NIS Regulations 2018: guide for the health sector in England
- UK Parliament — Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill
Scope and independence: This playbook is an IG-Smart planning resource. It is not an NHS publication, does not confer certification, NHS approval or a compliance determination, and does not replace the official standards, a mandatory local process or qualified clinical, legal or regulatory advice.
Scope, limitations and responsible use
- General guidance only. This resource reflects IG-Smart's interpretation of cited materials as at the stated research date. Some material was accessed through archived official documents or indexed official pages. Requirements change; verify current official text, applicability and effective dates before relying on it.
- Not an official NHS publication. NHS England, NHS England Digital and other bodies named here have not reviewed or endorsed this playbook.
- Not individual advice. Applicability depends on your organisation, technology, intended use, contracts and setting. Obtain qualified legal, clinical safety or regulatory advice for specific decisions.
- No certification or compliance confirmation. Using the playbook, its checklist, examples or the Evidence Starter Register does not certify a product or organisation, or confirm compliance, assurance or procurement readiness.
- Responsibilities stay where they are. Nothing here transfers duties from manufacturers, suppliers, deploying organisations, Clinical Safety Officers, controllers or other accountable parties.
- No advisory engagement by access alone. Reading or downloading the playbook does not, by itself, create a professional advisory engagement with IG-Smart. Any commissioned services are subject to separately agreed scope and terms.
- Liability. Use of this resource is subject to IG-Smart's Website Terms of Use. Nothing in this notice excludes or limits liability where that would be unlawful.
IG-Smart Ltd · Edition 1.2 · Reviewed and approved for publication by IG-Smart. Professional review: reviewed and approved for publication by IG-Smart. IG-Smart will review this playbook when a referenced standard, form or toolkit version changes, and in any case within 12 months of publication.
